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Review 
In her book Aboriginal Customary Law: A Source of Common Law Title to 
Land, Ulla Secher engages on a highly theoretical level with the question of 
native title in the hope of developing an alternative approach to issues of 
land rights for Australian Indigenous People. Her proposed alternative 
approach is to frame Aboriginal customary law as a valid source of (English) 
common law title to land, in order to develop a new doctrine of tenure called 
ad veritatem. To do so, the author delves into the maze of British and 
Australian real-property law, by specifically focussing on its origin and 
application since 1788, in order to show how Aboriginal title can be a source 
of common law title.  
The book is divided into four parts and contains eight chapters. The author 
makes clear the rationale for each chapter, and in that sense it is high quality 
research in that it continually remains focussed on the primary theme of the 
book: aboriginal customary law as a source of common law title to land. 
Throughout the work Secher’s deep analysis questions the fundamental 
assumptions of the legal nature of Indigenous land rights. Part I is an 
extensive look at the history of land law pre-Mabo, and will have historians 
of land law (particularly those stemming from British law) in awe. Part II 
deals with the doctrine of tenure post-Mabo, where she argues for the 
emergence of the Doctrine of Tenure ad Veritatem. Part III looks at the 
meaning of radical title in Australia post-Mabo. In part IV she examines the 
implications of the crown’s radical title in foreign jurisdictions, including 
South Africa. 
She starts with an analysis of the decision of the High Court of Australia in 
Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (Mabo),1 where she focusses on the finding that 
upon the acquisition of sovereignty, the Crown acquired a radical title in 
land. She delves into the history of radical title to better understand the 
origins of this title, and what this means to Aboriginal land rights in Australia 
(and possibly other former British colonies). She then continues to make the 
argument that radical title is merely a bare title that bestows no beneficial 
entitlement to the related land for the Crown. It then consists of two aspects: 
one, it advances a doctrine of tenure as it applies in Australia, but it is also 
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connected to sovereignty, as it supports the Crown’s power to convert this 
radical title to beneficial ownership.2 This in effect rejects the court’s finding 
that the Crown acquired beneficial ownership of land automatically (which 
was not subject to native title), because there was no other proprietor. 
Secher calls for a distinction between property and sovereignty.3 
Once we accept that the unalienated land is not in the Crown’s beneficial 
ownership, it becomes possible for Secher to bring in her earlier (very 
thorough and detailed) theoretical and historical arguments about the nature 
of pre-feudal forms of landholding and traditional exceptions to the feudal 
doctrine of tenure in the hope of classifying the legal status. Here folkland 
and tenure by ancient demesne, the origins and functioning of which she 
discusses thoroughly in part I, becomes important. As far as folkland is 
concerned, it provides Secher with the argument that fundamental common 
law principles and radical title make it possible for Aboriginal people to 
establish common law title in land, if they can prove title in the land through 
their own custom. This will imply that the people had rights before the 
sovereignty established the common law title, and that English land law 
applicable to pre-feudal landholding is applicable and subject to pre-existing 
Aboriginal rights. Hence, Aboriginal title as a source of common law. 
Her analysis of the history, the theory and the cases is incredibly detailed 
with extensive argument being made. For a scholar who is not familiar with 
British or Australian real-property law, this often means having to reread 
some arguments in order to make sense of them. 
The book will be of interest to scholars who wish to reconceptualise the 
Crown’s title in former British colonies. It is debatable whether this would be 
of much help in South Africa given South Africa’s history of having two 
colonial powers, with South African property law mostly resting on common 
law and legislation with, of course, the Constitution always motivating for 
the development of the common law in line with the Constitution. My 
reservation about the usefulness of her arguments lies is the fact that 
customary law is not a source of common law but a legal system in its own 
right, as recognised by the Constitution. One could perhaps argue that with 
the court’s propensity, despite its reservations, to evaluate customary law 
land rights through a common law lens, Secher’s theory opens up the 
possibility of allowing recognition for a greater range of indigenous land 
rights as a source of common law title. The test for the proof of common law 
customary title is also easily met: a demonstration “pre-sovereignty 
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laws/customs of an identifiable Aboriginal group pursuant to which land was 
purposively occupied”.4 Since this seems very similar to the test developed 
by the Constitutional Court in Alexcor v Richtersveld Community5 to prove 
customary title in land at annexation, the arguments made in the book might 
be of importance in the future, especially if the 1913 cut-off date for 
restitution claims is reconsidered. 
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